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ABSTRACT
In 2010 the United States Supreme Court delivered an opinion in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission which reversed decades of federal campaign finance law. The
Court held that corporations, unions, and other entities could not be subject to federal campaign
finance laws that restricted these organizations from engaging in independent expenditures using
general treasury funds – i.e., advocating for the election or defeat of a specific candidate for
federal office. Two months later, in SpeechNow v. Federal Election Commission, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia extended the ruling to apply to non-profit organizations.
The result of this pair of rulings was the creation of the “Super PAC” – a type of political action
committee than can spend unlimitedly on expressly advocating for the election or defeat of a
candidate for federal office. A wealth of scholarship emerged in the aftermath of Citizens United.
One of these bodies of literature contended over whether Super PACs were de facto extensions
of the parties, or whether the Super PAC represented a novel entity that could be used by party
outsiders to challenge the party insiders. I investigated the ability of party outsiders and factions
to fundraise before and after the 2010 ruling to determine whether Citizens United created an
opening for party outsiders. I used a database consisting of over 100 million contribution records
from the Federal Election Commission to review a list of candidates for federal office and their
numerical ideology scores. I used a modified z-score to standardize the ideology of candidates,
and then conducted a comparative analysis of the percentage of total contributions that went to
extreme candidates in Republican Presidential primaries both before and after 2010. I found that
extreme candidates were indeed better off after Citizens United.
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______________________________

CHAPTER I
OPENING STATEMENT
______________________________
Electoral competition and representation are two cornerstones of democratic government.
The ability of various citizens to compete for the chance to represent and enact into law the will
of the people is paramount to the very fabric of the United States. These values are not the only
ones that society has strived for years to maintain. From time to time, our nation experiences a
period of a transformational value conflict in which attempts are made to reconcile one value
with another. In the case of campaign finance, the value conflict has been framed largely as a
clash between equality and liberty (e.g., Kang, 2010a). On the one hand, proponents of equality
argue that the government ought to regulate the amount of influence that certain speakers should
have in the context of political campaigns and in the interest of leveling the playing field; on the
other hand, proponents of liberty argue that such regulation infringes upon certain individuals’
right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment. In 2010, this value conflict resurfaced
when the United States Supreme Court issued a decision in a pivotal case that reshaped the
terrain of campaign finance forever. The case was Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission (552 U.S. 1278 (2010)). This thesis addresses one of the consequences of that
decision. Before doing so, however, I provide a concise briefing on campaign finance law to
situate the ruling in the context of the overall legal category.
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1.2 Understanding Campaign Finance Law
Campaign finance is one of the most confusing areas of American law. The vast maze of
rules governing campaign finance includes FEC, IRS, and FCC regulations, state and federal
statutes, and constitutional law, all of which form a nexus of largely vague parameters that even
some of the most adept lawyers consider a legal minefield riddled with ambiguity (Kang, 2010a,
p. 1164). Several of the laws and rules carry strict criminal liability under federal felony statutes
which over time have contributed to the evolution of campaign finance as an industry in its own
right. In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a decision in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission (552 U.S. 1278 (2010)) which reinvigorated a national debate over
campaign finance reform in both the popular media as well as in scholarly circles. Contrary to
much of the popular criticism following the decision, which portrayed the ruling as, for example,
having “opened the floodgates for special interests to spend without limit in our elections”
(Obama, 2010), the fact is that the decision in Citizens United merely extended a pre-existing
judicial doctrine which had been steadily deregulating the world of campaign finance (Fishkin &
Gerken, 2015; Gerken, 2014; Kang, 2010a). To understand the significance of Citizens United,
the decision must be viewed in the context of the legal history of campaign finance.
In 1971, Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”), 52 U.S.C. §
30101 (1972). FECA, in combination with its 1976 amendments, heralded the first time that
Congress set limits on political contributions and expenditures; established the Federal Election
Commission (FEC) to which rule-making authority was delegated; established spending limits;
and mandated disclosure of campaign expenditures. Since the passage of FECA nearly fifty years
ago, a series of court cases have steadily challenged its provisions. Some federal courts have
upheld FECA provisions, some have struck them down, and some have applied those precedents.
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All of these cases can essentially be conceived of as rules on source and size restrictions. This
process began in 1976.
In 1976, FECA was first challenged before the U.S. Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo
(424 U.S. 1 (1976)). In Buckley, the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that FECA provisions
capping candidates’ own expenditures violated freedom of speech. Id. However, the Court did
not find FECA provisions limiting contributions to campaigns to be unconstitutional. Id. As a
result, the Court created a campaign finance world in which “politicians’ appetite for money
would be limitless but their ability to get it would not” (Gerken, 2014, p. 906). Then, in 1990, the
Supreme Court held in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (494 U.S. 652 (1990)) that
corporations did not have a right under the First Amendment to engage in independent
expenditures using general treasury funds.1 The Court in Austin held further that non-profit
organizations could be subject to the same prohibitions on independent expenditures. Id.
Twelve years later, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) (2
U.S.C. § 441, et seq. (2002)) which, in relevant part, prohibited political parties from raising and
spending “soft money” – that is, money not spent in direct support of a specified candidate (i.e.,
“express advocacy”).2 Moreover, the BCRA established and defined the concept of an
“electioneering communication” – any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication…that refers
to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office and… is made within sixty (60) days of a
general election…or thirty (30) days of a caucus or primary election.” 52 U.S.C. § 30104
(f)(3)(A)(i)(II). The section of this law reading “refers to a clearly identified candidate for federal
office” is where the phrase “express advocacy” is derived – that is, directly advocating for the

1

“Independent expenditures” are those made in support of a candidate for federal office but
without any coordination or consultation with the campaign committee or its agents.
2
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (2002) is also known as the “McCain-Feingold Act.”
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election or defeat of a candidate for federal office. Under the BCRA, if an entity engaged in
express advocacy, then that entity fell within the regulatory scope of the FEC and contributions
limits applied. Due to the nature of political parties, they coordinate with campaign committees,
and therefore they are subject to contribution limits under the BCRA. The BCRA did not,
however, prevent non-profit organizations known as “527s” from raising or spending soft
money.3 As a result, the prominence of 527s grew significantly as they began receiving the
contributions that had previously gone directly to the formal parties. This rechanneling of funds
from parties to 527s that resulted from the BCRA is an example of an enduring concept in
campaign finance research and literature known as the “hydraulics” of campaign finance reform
– that is, the power of money in politics cannot be destroyed, only channeled through alternative
avenues in pursuit of the same ends (Issacharoff & Karlan, 1999).
In 2003, provisions of the BCRA were challenged as unconstitutional in McConnell v.
Federal Election Commission (540 U.S. 93 (2003)). In McConnell, the U.S. Supreme Court held
as constitutional provisions of the BCRA prohibiting corporations and labor unions from using
general treasury funds to engage in independent expenditures. Id.
The prominence of 527s in federal elections was first highlighted in the 2004 cycle where
aggregate 527 receipts reached over $558,000,000 million (adjusted to real 2016 USD) (527s |
OpenSecrets, 2017a). The parties and their heavyweight donors, having lost the ability to raise
and spend soft money via the formal party organizations with the passage of the BCRA,
gravitated toward 527s in order to achieve the same goal: amassing and dispensing large sums of
money in pursuit of electoral victory (Gerken, 2014). Moneyed interests began using 527s to

3

So-called “527s” derive their name from section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. §
527) which codifies requirements for tax-exempt status of certain political organizations.
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finance so-called “issue ads” where political issues could be addressed and viewers could be
urged to vote in particular ways, but 527s could not engage in “express advocacy” – that is,
expressly advocating for the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office.
Then, in 2010, in Citizens United, the U.S. Supreme Court delivered two seminal rulings.
First, it held that corporations and unions could not be subject to prohibitions on independent
expenditures as mandated by FECA and upheld in Austin. Here, Citizens United reversed Austin
when the Court held that “government may not, under the First Amendment, suppress political
speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity” (Citizens United, 558 U.S. 1278 (2010)).
Second, the Court in Citizens United struck down the BCRA provisions barring corporate
independent expenditures, which, in effect, overruled this part of McConnell. The U.S. Supreme
Court in Citizens United did not, however, review such bans on non-profit groups. Nevertheless,
two months later, in SpeechNow v. Federal Election Commission (559 F.3d 686 (2010)), the U.S
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia relied on the ruling in Citizens United in holding
that 527 organizations engaging in independent expenditures could not be subject to FECA and
BCRA provisions restricting source or size of receipts, nor size of expenditures. SpeechNow
overruled so much of Austin that upheld limits on non-profits’ expenditures. Id. The D.C.
Circuit further held that private individuals making contributions to 527s could not be subject to
monetary limits either. Id. The ruling in Citizens United and its doctrinal extension in
SpeechNow gave birth to the “Super PAC” – a derivative of a 527 and a type of political action
committee that can raise and spend unlimited sums of money on express advocacy at any time,
so long as they do not coordinate with campaigns or their agents.
In 2012, Barack Obama ran for re-election against Mitt Romney as we witnessed the first
election cycle in which Super PACs were engaged. That year, the aggregated funds raised by
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Super PACs were over $828 million (Super PACs | OpenSecrets, 2017b). The following
presidential election cycle made history with aggregated Super PAC receipts totaling more than
$7.1 billion (Super PACs | OpenSecrets, 2017c). To put these figures into perspective, consider
this: in 2012, Super PACs spent more than double what political parties spent on campaigning,
and in 2016, Super PACs spent about the same (Outside Spending | OpenSecrets, 2013a, 2017a).
Evidently, Super PACs have become one of, if not the most, prime spending vehicle employed in
federal elections.
1.3 Avenue of Inquiry & Thesis Outline
One can sympathize with those who claim too much money is flowing into and out of
these entities. Nevertheless, the sheer amount of money begs the question of whether Super
PACs are merely vehicles for exercising free speech, or whether they are vehicles for the ultrawealthy to exercise a highly disproportionate amount of political influence. This inquiry, albeit
attractive, is normative in nature, and one that I refrain from reviewing in this thesis. Instead, I
conduct an empirical analysis to determine how Super PACs have been used by and for “party
rebels” to amass funds and exert political influence. This question can be answered empirically
and contributes to what we know about the practical operations of Super PACs, party outsiders,
and campaign finance more generally.
The outline of this work is as follows: Chapter 2 features a nuanced review of the
relevant literature containing both similar and competing accounts of scholarly answers to the
aforementioned research question, and a hypothesis is developed and presented. Following the
literature review, Chapter 3 sets forth the variables in the hypothesis, the data used to fuel them,
and the parameters of the research design. In Chapter 4, I set forth the results of the analysis and
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number of avenues for future and further research. Finally, in Chapter 5, I conclude.
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______________________________

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
______________________________
In seeking to answer the question how have Super PACs been used by and for party
rebels and factions in the 2016 Republican primary in pursuit of amassing funds and martialing
political influence, this work builds on an array of prior research and relevant scholarly literature.
First, a review of literature on democratic theory establishes a benchmark for undertaking an
examination of the court’s ruling in Citizens United in the context of the American political
arrangement. Second, a nuanced summary of two competing schools of thought that emerged in
the campaign finance literature is presented – the “Party Network School” and the “Shadow
Party Power School.” Third, a survey of scholarly research on factions in politics and within
parties lays out the presence and type of organized interests that can and arguably do enjoy the
benefits of Super PACs. The hypothesis is developed and advanced based on the logical and
empirical strengths and weaknesses of each school of thought.
2.2 Democracy: Parties, Competition, Representation, and Candidate Selection
The concepts of electoral competition and representation are inextricably intertwined
tenets of democratic theory. While scholars have clashed over the definitions of these terms,
there is a general consensus that representation and competition are and ought to be inherent in
any democratic system. Essentially all contemporary democracies provide for electoral
competition, albeit to varying degrees, yet a significant point of difference between them is the
process through which each system selects its candidates, and these systems all have different
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consequences for the level of competition and representation they experience (Craig, 2016;
Hazan & Rahat, 2001, 2010; Rahat, Hazan, & Katz, 2008). Research has consistently
demonstrated the consequences of various aspects of candidate selection methods. Hazan &
Rahat (2010) found that inclusiveness and participatory openness impacted representativeness of
candidates, internal party nomination competitiveness, and responsiveness. Hazan & Rahat
(2001) also found that the level of internal party democracy was correlated with the power of
incumbents, internal competition, candidate representativeness, and intra-party conflict. Rahat,
Hazan, & Katz (2008) further demonstrated the impact of intra-party democracy and candidate
selection methods on inclusive participation, competition, and representativeness. Similarly,
Katz (2001) found that inclusiveness impacted the level of internal party democracy. Moreover,
Craig (2016) demonstrated that the strength of political parties over internal candidate selection
affects the representativeness of the lists of candidates that are produced. In this regard, scholars
have often characterized the United States as an oddity in the candidate selection process due to
its relatively open and decentralized nature (see for instance Craig, 2016; Gallagher & Marsh,
1988).
2.3 United States: “The Outlier.”
Juxtaposed with its European counterparts, the United States clearly fits the bill for what
scholars like Craig (2016, p. 799) have referred to as an “outlier” in the candidate selection
process. One of the chief reasons underlying the distinction is the degree of direct control that
political parties in Europe exercise over candidate selection compared to the control of American
political parties over same. The reason behind this phenomenon, as described by Hazan & Rahat
(2010), is that the candidate selection process in the United States is governed by state and
federal law. In Europe, however, it is predominantly the parties themselves that dictate their
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internal candidate selection methods (Hazan & Rahat, 2010). In the United States, virtually any
citizen can run for federal office on the ticket of any party, provided they secure enough
signatures and have reached a certain age. Such is not the case in the vast majority of European
countries where political parties exercise a significant degree of direct control over candidate
selection (Craig, 2016; Rahat & Hazan, 2001).
Democratic theorists have emphasized the permeable design of liberal democracies (e.g.,
Dahl, 1956; Truman, 1951), lending attending to the plethora of avenues available for citizens to
advance particular policy agendas (Urbinati & Warren, 2008, p. 392). The candidate selection
process in the United States, as described above, is exemplary of such a permeable design. At
first glance, such an open and decentralized system, somewhat out of the hands of the two
preeminent political parties, might seem to land in lockstep with romanticized notions of
democracy. After peeling back a few layers, however, the extant literature reveals a candidate
selection system susceptible to takeover by factions and insurgent movements unrepresentative
of the party label under which they operate (e.g., Brady, Han, & Pope, 2007; Craig, 2016).
2.4 Intra-Party Democracy, Power and Influence of Parties Over Candidate Selection
Before addressing the role of factions in presidential primaries, it is necessary to unwind
the notions of intra-party democracy and the role of parties in the candidate selection process.
Unsurprisingly, an assessment of the quality of any democratic system is not confined to the
extent to which the will of the majority is realized through law and policy (Rahat, Hazan, &
Katz, 2008, p. 663). Important to note here is that democratic theory itself is not limited to
discussions of entire polities and their constituents, but extends to lower electoral, competitive,
institutional, and organizational levels (e.g., parties). From this idea stems the notion of parties
themselves being internally democratic (e.g., Rahat, Hazan, & Katz, 2008). The distinction
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between democracy at the larger and lower level can be understood as “system level democracy”
and “intra-party democracy”, respectively (Rahat, Hazan, & Katz, 2008). For the purpose of
examining factions in presidential primaries, I focus on the latter.
Research has documented the effect of the structure of intra-party competition on
electoral outcomes. Ansolabehere, Hansen, Hirano & Snyder (2007), for example, found that the
structure of intra-party competition may affect the incumbency advantage. Findings like these
are reminders that the dynamics of competition within parties do indeed matter because they
determine whether or not winners and losers in these contests are actually representative of the
party as a whole. As mentioned above, particular candidate selection arrangements have unique
consequences for the levels of competition and representation that a political system experiences.
Such relationships include the impact of inclusiveness and participatory openness on candidate
representativeness (Hazan & Rahat, 2010); the level of internal party democracy on the power of
incumbents, internal competition, candidate representativeness, and intra-party conflict (Hazan &
Rahat, 2001); the impact of intra-party democracy on inclusive participation, competition, and
candidate representativeness (Rahat, Hazan, & Katz, 2001); the impact of inclusiveness on the
level of internal party democracy (Katz, 2001); the impact of the strength of political parties over
internal candidate selection on candidate representativeness (Craig, 2016); and the impact of
intra-party democracy on parties’ ability to govern democratically (Reiter, 2004). One of the
salient functions of candidate selection systems is the inherent vetting process through which
candidates must trek (Katz, 2001, p. 277). Some have suggested, however, that one of the
consequences of relatively open internal candidate selection arrangements is the production of
candidates and officeholders unrepresentative of the party (e.g, Craig, 2016; Hazan & Rahat,
2001, 2010; Rahat, Hazan, & Katz, 2008).
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In an incisive analysis of the importance and function of political parties, Katz (2001)
articulated four such factors:
First, a party’s candidates define and constitute its public face in an election; second,
candidates are the main recruitment pools for parties; third, representatives represent
individual constituencies as well as larger constituencies; and fourth, candidacy is
valuable because of the constraints, influence, and power that can be exercised by
candidates, and even more so because of the constraints, influence, and power that can be
deployed if that candidate is elected. (p. 278).
Rahat, Hazan, & Katz (2008, p. 664) parallel Katz’s (2001) assessment of the importance of
political parties in positing that intra-party democracy has the potential to “impede the
advancement of system level democracy.” If the the two preeminent parties in the United States
– the DNC and RNC – exercise such a comparatively miniscule degree of direct control over
candidate selection, then who or what does?
2.5 Framing and Understanding the Consequences of Citizens United and Super PACs
Departing from the notion that the candidate selection process in the United States is
vastly open and susceptible to takeover by factions and insurgent movements unrepresentative of
the broader party electorate (Rahat, Hazan, & Katz, 2008; Rahat & Hazan, 2001, 2010; Masket,
2009; Brady, et al., 2007; Craig, 2016; Gallagher & Marsh, 1988; Geer, 1988), two classes of
scholarly literature have emerged which offer divergent appraisals of how the ruling in Citizens
United impacted this phenomenon. First, the “Party Network School” (Bedlington & Malbin,
2003; Desmarais, La Raja, & Kowal, 2014; Hernsson, 2009; Koger, Masket, & Noel, 2009,
2010; Skinner, Masket, & Dulio, 2012, 2013), and second, the “Shadow Party Power School”
(Ansolabehere & Snyder, 2000; Brooks & Murov, 2012; Christenson & Smidt, 2014; Farrar-
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Myers & Skinner, 2012; Fishkin & Gerken, 2015; Gerken, 2014; Issacharoff & Karlan, 1999;
Kang, 2005, 2013; Nelson, 2013; Olsen & Scala, 2016; Opensecrets, 2017a). The bone of
contention between the two camps is whether outside groups like 527s and Super PACs benefit
the parties and campaign committees, or whether they erode their ability to conduct campaign
operations.
2.6 The Party Network School
The Party Network School is a conglomerate of scholarly research and literature which
collectively asserts that outside committees such as 527s work together with the parties and
campaign committees and are part and parcel of what is to be understood as a “political party.”
This school contends that 527s are de facto extensions of the formal parties. Moreover, it posits
the existence of an “extended party network” or an “expanded party network” (EPN), composed
of a multifarious collection of actors including interest groups, media, and candidate committees
that work in tandem in pursuit of parallel objectives (Koger, Masket, & Noel, 2009). This
collection of actors, according to the Party Network School, is essentially a service industry of
political professionals that cater to the ambitions of the parties – i.e., a group of insiders.
Koger, Masket, & Noel (2009) advanced the notion of an extended party network (EPN).
The authors employed social network analysis to study lists of names transferred between
political organizations and found two separate and distinct networks of personnel – one
Democratic and one Republican – that worked to “funnel” information to the top of their
respective party sitting at the apex of each EPN. These findings are consistent with Skinner
(2005), who illustrated that a host of consultants, attorneys, lobbyists, and other personnel and
committees work as “subcontractors” for the DNC and the RNC. Moreover, Skinner (2005)
found that American political parties can be understood as two separate and distinct masses, one
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Democratic and one Republican, each of which is composed of a range of interests, groups, and
personnel that work to assist the larger goals of the entire camp.
Bedlington & Malbin (2003) substantiated the notion of the EPN concept by finding that
campaign committees were responsible for a significant percentage of party donation receipts.
Although their work predates the coining of the phrase “extended party network” (Koger,
Masket, & Dulio, 2009), Bedlington & Malbin (2003) found that in 2000, campaign committees
were responsible for approximately 80% of DNC donation receipts, and just under 90% of RNC
donation receipts (p. 133). The picture painted by Bedlington & Malbin (2003) was clearly one
of internal party cooperation. Again, regarding internal party cooperation, Koger, Masket, &
Noel (2010) sought to identify factions within the Democratic and Republican parties and the
extent to which these factions cooperate. Using social network analysis again, the authors
identified two “expanded party networks” – one for each major party. Koger, Masket, & Noel
(2010) further found that rival factions did in fact cooperate to a significant degree by, for
example, sharing membership lists.
On the topic of 527s specifically, Skinner, Masket, & Dulio (2012) used employment
history data to investigate the personnel links between 527s and other politically-oriented
organizations. Skinner, Masket, & Dulio (2012) found that “[527s] [were] in a position to
facilitate collective action among virtually all key party actors” (p. 78). They concluded that 527s
were highly central to political party networks (p. 78). The authors contended further that
restrictions on party expenditures to candidates hampered the parties’ ability to direct large sums
of money to specific candidates, and 527s have become the chief vehicle for carrying out this
function (p. 79). The following year, Skinner, Masket, & Dulio (2013) conducted a companion
investigation. This time around, they examined the staffing of the largest active 527s in the 2004
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and 2006 election cycles and found that 527s played an integral role in conducting the operations
that the BCRA prohibited the parties from doing themselves (e.g., raising “soft money”). The
authors concluded that 527s do not undermine the party system, and that 527s function as “arms”
of the parties (p. 152). Evidently, the narrative portrayed by Skinner, Masket, & Dulio (2012,
2013) is that outside groups like 527s are part and parcel of the EPNs and assist the DNC and the
RNC in campaigning. Their findings echo that of Herrnson (2009), who studied campaign
spending of parties, party-connected groups, and allied PACs in federal elections between 1996
and 2007 and found significant coordination between 527s and the parties.
In an additional work, Desmarais, La Raja, & Kowal (2014) investigated the role of
EPNs in supporting candidates and shaping electoral outcomes. Consistent with Koger, Masket,
& Noel (2010), Desmarais, La Raja, & Kowal (2014) studied contributions to House campaigns
and identified two EPNs – one Democratic and one Republican – both of which are composed of
a diverse group of separate and overlapping interests that finance campaigns. They found that
candidates supported by “densely interconnected partisan communities have a greater likelihood
of winning compared to those with similar campaign resources and political backgrounds, but
without EPN backing” (p. 208) – i.e., so-called party “insiders” were better off than party
“outsiders.” These findings are consistent with other works which found no correlation between
campaign resources and likelihood of electoral victory (e.g., La Raja, Schaffner, 2013).
Evidently, this camp is best understood as a group advancing the contention that modern
political parties are composed of a highly diverse range of actors, interests and entities that seek
to advance the goals of the parties sitting at the apex of each respective EPN. As is made clear by
their data, this school is predominantly concerned with studying personnel to draw conclusions
about the role of 527s in the campaign arena. As such, the Party Network School asserts that
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groups like 527s, on balance, offer a beneficial function to parties. In terms of answering the
research question of how have Super PACs been used by and for party rebels and factions in the
2016 Republican primary in pursuit of amassing funds and martialing political influence, the
Party Network School collectively asserts that outside groups would assist the parties by
conducting operations that the BCRA prohibits them from conducting, and thus offer a benefit to
the parties.
2.7 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Party Network School
In evaluating the relative costs and benefits of the Party Network School through a
logical and empirical lens, I consider two aspects of the data studied. I address each of these
separately. First is timing of the data, and second is the type of data.
The data used by the Party Network School is mostly drawn from the 2002, 2004, and
2006 federal election cycles – the first three cycles succeeding the passage of the BCRA. As
such, this school offers insight into the immediate effects stemming from the introduction of
527s into the campaign finance arena.
Nevertheless, the data used by the Party Network School, while valuable, may no longer
hold water in the modern milieu of campaign finance. The data from the 2002, 2004, and 2006
election cycles are over a decade old. The campaign finance landscape has undergone various
shifts and developments since 2006 (Fishkin & Gerken, 2015) including, for example, the rulings
in Citizens United and SpeechNow which deregulated 527s and gave birth to the Super PAC.
This is cause for concern for two reasons. First, given the significance of the 2010 rulings with
respect to the massive change in how 527s are treated under federal law, the trends identified by
the Party Network School using the 2002-2006 data may no longer apply because the campaign
finance regulatory framework has changed. Second, the picture painted by the Party Network
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School in terms of the cooperative and coordinating relationship between parties and 527s may
have been affected by the deregulation of 527s that resulted from the 2010 rulings. Furthermore,
Koger, Masket, & Dulio (2010) conceded that the data used was by no means exhaustive or allinclusive (p. 49). Moreover, Skinner, Masket, & Dulio (2012, 2013) noted that 527s are only one
kind of entity that parties used to aid in adapting to the changing electoral environment (p. 152).
As a result, the data used by this school focuses largely on only one type of outside vehicle:
527s. Therefore, the conclusions forwarded by this school may fail to capture trends and political
activity of outside groups other than 527s. Lastly, while social network analysis is indeed an
innovative research method, Koger, Masket, & Noel (2010) have admitted that it is incomplete
(p. 653).
The second aspect of the Party Network School’s data is the type, which is mainly
personnel data. The Party Network School contends that 527s are de facto extensions of the
formal parties. This research uses social network analysis to demonstrate that modern political
parties are comprised of a multitudinous and diverse collection of entities, interests, and, most
importantly, personnel, all of whom work to advance the goals of the parties. The Party Network
School is set apart from other campaign finance research by this emphasis on personnel and
people. The school argues that the personnel overlap exhibited by the data reveals cooperative
party networks and thus 527s, in the Party Network School’s estimation, should be considered
beneficial extensions of the parties.
Although this group of research offers a unique review of personnel overlap to highlight
links between 527s and parties, the major explanatory disadvantage lies in the school’s
assumption that all of the people and 527s studied simply work together and in unison in an
effort to assist the party sitting at the top of each EPN – i.e., the school assumes that all of these
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people are party “insiders.” In this school’s view, the only democratically troubling concern is
the possibility of actors who might operate beyond the parameters of the EPNs. At issue here is
the Party Network School’s failure to explicitly define what might constitute a party “insider” or
“outsider.” In failing to do so, the school is unable to account for the presence of factions within
each EPN. This is a major disadvantage. In assuming that everybody within each EPN simply
works together, the school disregards strong factional divisions within each EPN. The presence
and function of factions is discussed below.
2.8 The Shadow Party Power School
The second of the two camps encompasses a group of research which contends that the
increasing trend of deregulating outside groups’ ability to conduct political operations is causing
the power of politics to shift away from parties and campaign committees and into the hands of
relatively unaccountable entities such as 527s and Super PACs. Interestingly, proponents of this
school do not disagree with proponents of their intellectual counterpart – the Party Network
School – in conceptualizing a political party. Indeed, one work (Fishkin & Gerken, 2015) even
cites Koger, Masket, & Noel (2009) in arguing that “a party today is best understood as a loose
coalition of diverse entities, some official and some not, organized around a popular national
brand” (Fishkin & Gerken, 2015, p. 187). Nevertheless, this common point of departure is only
one of a few similarities among the two camps. In short, the Shadow Party Power School is
united by four tenets: outside groups lack transparency; power of outside groups to influence
public opinion; scope of functions carried out by outside groups; and the financial power of
outside groups.
Political parties ought to be the venues through which the electorate enjoys greater
accountability from their representatives (Ansolabeher, et al., 2000). When the vast majority of
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campaign operations are conducted by outside groups, accountability and transparency decrease
(Brooks & Murov, 2012). Ansolabehere et al. (2000) suggested that regulating the flow of
money to and from parties and campaign committees would only cause that money to flow into
the hands of unaccountable entities. This suggestion overlaps with one of the most highly
regarded works in the campaign finance literature which advanced the concept of the “hydraulics
of campaign finance reform” – that is, money in politics cannot be destroyed, only channeled
through alternative means (Issaccharoff & Karlan, 1999). Nevertheless, although Ansolbehere et
al.’s (2000) work predates the passage of the BCRA, which gave rise to the prominence of 527s
in politics, their wisdom is no less apparent in the subsequent campaign finance landscape, as
their contention has been echoed by many works even years later (e.g., Fishkin & Gerken, 2015;
Gerken, 2014; Nelson, 2013). Nevertheless, if regulating the flow of money to and from parties
and campaign committees can cause outside groups to have comparatively more power, then it
follows that deregulating the outside groups directly would also empower outside groups relative
to parties and campaign committees. Such is exactly what the Shadow Party Power School
contends was the result of the rulings in Citizens United and SpeechNow.
The first tenet of the Shadow Party Power School is transparency. This school posits that
the identity of those funding Super PACs is all but clear (Brooks & Murov, 2012; Fishkin &
Gerken, 2015; Gerken, 2014). Even a cursory glance at the top-spending Super PACs in 2016,
for example, reveals a catalogue of ambiguously-titled groups to which no obvious candidate can
be associated (Super PACs | OpenSecrets, 2017c). Figure 2.1 lists the top-spending Super PACs
in the 2016 cycle. Viewers of ads funded by Super PACs are thus unable to readily associate a
particular ad or funder with a particular candidate (Brooks & Murov, 2012). The issue then, as
this school asserts, is that Super PACs have the power to attack candidates without the risk of a
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negative backlash on the image of the candidate that the Super PAC actually supports (Brooks &
Murov, 2012). Brooks & Murov (2012) demonstrated the power of negative attack ads. While
the parties, campaign committees, and Super PACs are all required to disclose their identity
when showing an advertisement, the parties and campaign committees do not enjoy the luxury of
hiding behind an ambiguous label. As a result, according to the Shadow Party Power School,
Super PACs are more powerful than parties and campaign committees in this regard because
Super PACs can run ads without the fear of a negative backlash.
Figure 2.1 – List of top 20 Super PACs spending in the 2016 federal election cycle.
Name of Super PAC

Independent Expenditures
(in 2017 USD)
$133,407,972
$86,817,138
$85,994,270
$75,389,818
$55,443,483
$50,010,166
$47,470,121
$40,125,691
$33,167,285
$29,728,798
$24,267,135
$24,264,009
$21,194,739
$19,181,962
$18,578,852
$18,327,047
$15,689,081
$14,849,164
$13,454,894
$13,387,635

Priorities USA Action
Right to Rise USA
Senate Leadership Fund
Senate Majority PAC
Conservative Solutions PAC
Get Our Jobs Back
House Majority PAC
Congressional Leadership Fund
Women Vote!
Freedom Partners Action Fund
Granite State Solutions
Future45
Rebuilding America Now
Club for Growth Action
America Leads
Our Principles PAC
League of Conservation Voters
Ending Spending Action Fund
Make America Number 1
Independence USA PAC
Source: (Super PACs | OpenSecrets, 2017c).
Notes: The source of this data is OpenSecrets.Org, which compiled the data from FEC
disclosures. The figures are current as of April 3, 2017.
Secondly, the capacity of Super PACs to actually influence public opinion is welldocumented. Research has vividly demonstrated the influence of Super PACs in various
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presidential and primary races at the federal level (e.g., Christenson & Smidt, 2014) and the
power to influence public opinion (e.g., Brooks & Murov, 2012; Christenson & Smidt, 2014).
Third, this school argues that outside groups – including and especially Super PACs –
have taken over a substantial portion of functions traditionally carried out by the parties (FarrarMyers & Skinner, 2012, p. 23; Fishkin & Gerken, 2015; Gerken, 2014; Nelson, 2013; Olsen &
Scala, 2016, p. 23). As Fishkin & Gerken (2015) observed:
Outside groups – groups that are neither official party entities nor candidate campaigns –
have taken over a startling array of the core party functions. These groups do not just run
campaign ads. They mobilize voters, test messages, organize donors, maintain
comprehensive voter databases, employ long-term campaign workers, and make major
strategic choices in individual campaigns. (p. 176).
Fishkin & Gerken (2015) further highlight the growing influence of Super PACs in shadow
campaigns – that is, the increasing outsourcing of political operations to unaccountable groups
(p. 188).
The fourth tenet of the Shadow Party Power School is, well, power. This school argues
that the power of Super PACs to engage in express advocacy without limit has created a situation
in which the parties and campaign committees are being challenged by a relatively minute group
of wealthy interests who employ Super PACs in pursuit of whipping influence in elections. As
one scholar stated, “[t]he legal capacity of Super PACs to receive uncapped contributions
enhanced the capacity of very wealthy individuals to exercise influence in electoral politics and
even finance presidential campaigns almost by themselves” (Kang, 2013, p. 1917). This notion
of outside groups becoming somewhat more powerful relative to the parties was established
previously by Kang (2005), when he argued that the notion of the hydraulics of campaign
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finance reform advanced by Isaccharoff & Karlan (1999) was wrong. Kang (2005) argued that
campaign finance reform measures, instead of simply shifting money into alternative avenues,
actually shift power into alternative avenues.
In 2012 – the first year in which the Super PAC was engaged in presidential elections –
aggregated funds raised by Super PACs were over $828 million (Super PACs | OpenSecrets,
2017b). In the following presidential election cycle this figure reached increased by a factor of
eight, reaching over $7.1 billion (Super PACs | OpenSecrets, 2017c). To put these figures into
perspective, consider this: in 2012, Super PACs spent more than double what political parties
spent on campaigning, and in 2016, Super PACs spent about the same (Outside Spending |
OpenSecrets, 2013a, 2017a). Of course, the argument could be made that although Super PACs
are indeed able to engage in express advocacy without monetary limits, they pose no substantial
threat to the parties and campaign committees because they are forbidden from coordinating with
candidates. This argument, while theoretically attractive, cannot be sustained under the weight of
political reality. Research has vividly demonstrated that the legal definition of “coordination”
fails to capture the coordination that occurs in practice (Fishkin & Gerken, 2015; Garrett, 2012;
Gerken, 2014; Farrar-Myers & Skinner, 2012; Nelson, 2013). Scholars have referred to this
phenomenon as “functional coordination” (e.g., Farrar-Myers & Skinner, 2012). Perhaps one of
the most incisive and even embarrassing reviews of functional coordination was Nelson’s
(2013), which illustrated via case study the obvious functional coordination between campaigns
and Super PACs with the spouses of candidates working for the Super PACs which supported
the spouse’s campaign. In any event, this school highlights the storm of money being poured into
Super PACs and the fear that they challenge the power of political parties and campaign
committees.
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2.9 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Shadow Party Power School
In evaluating the strength and weaknesses of this school from a logical and empirical
standpoint, I consider method and data and scope of explanatory value.
First, in terms of method and data, the Shadow Party Power School examines data
derived from FEC disclosures that contain information on expenditure amounts of Super PACs
and identity of donors funding them. By and large, this school avoids a review of personnel and
instead focuses on “following the money,” so-to-speak. The school points out the cavalcade of
funds that have been poured into Super PACs and argues that the idea that Super PACs only
engage in independent expenditures devoid of any coordination with campaign committees is a
fairytale. Noting the documented presence of functional coordination (Farrar-Myers & Skinner,
2013), the Shadow Party Power School asserts that the massive sums of money spent by Super
PACs must be considered coordinated expenditures, which raises concerns for how powerful
Super PACs are and have become. The methods and data used here are instructive as to where
the money is flowing. The source of the data – the FEC – lends credibility to the veracity of the
figures.
Second and last, I consider the scope of the Shadow Party Power School’s explanatory
value. As stated above, this school essentially neglects a review of personnel and concentrates
almost exclusively on the flow of funds to and from outside groups. The result is a group of
research that makes claims about legal entities but is not in a position to draw conclusions about
personnel operating them. Indeed, a few works in this school have discussed persons and
directors of some of these entities (e.g., Nelson, 2013), but the majority of them have been used
merely to demonstrate the presence of functional coordination (e.g., Nelson, 2013). While the
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Shadow Party Power School does address the presence of party “outsiders” (e.g., Fishkin &
Gerken, 2015; Gerken, 2014), it nevertheless fails to offer a workable definition to that effect.
Overall, the Shadow Party Power School maintains that the ruling in Citizens United
deregulated 527s insofar as conducting political operations was concerned. The relative margin
for operability of 527s compared to the parties and campaign committees was augmented by
Citizens United and its daughter ruling in SpeechNow. This school argues further that the
deregulation of outside groups hampers the ability of the parties and campaign committees to
control the message and theme of a campaign, decreases transparency in federal politics, and
offers too much power to small groups unrepresentative of the broader party electorate. In terms
of answering the research question of how have Super PACs been used by and for party rebels
and factions in the 2016 Republican primary in pursuit of amassing funds and martialing
political influence, the Shadow Party Power School would assert that Super PACs degrade the
power of the parties and campaign committees.
Before diving into the hypothesis and the gap in the literature, I review factions in the
context of the American political arrangement and explain how the rulings in Citizens United and
SpeechNow changed the ability of factions to fundraise for campaigns.
2.10 Factions: Role and Presence in Presidential Primaries
Given the lack of direct control that parties exercise over candidate selection and the
openness by which such processes are characterized (e.g., Craig, 2016), scholars have
highlighted the existence of intra-party cleavages as well as the presence of intra-party
competition during elections. In 2005, Pew Research Center (2005) identified three subsets
within the Republican electorate: Enterprises (comprising about 9% of the general population);
Social Conservatives (comprising about 11%); and Progovernment Conservatives (comprising
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about 9%). In a study examining information exchange between party organizations, media
outlets, 527s, and interest groups, Koger, Masket, & Noel (2010) established the presence of
various factions within each of the two major parties. Similarly, in a thorough review of the
forces underlying the 2016 Republican presidential primaries, Olsen & Scala (2016) profiled and
identified four separate factions in the Republican party: moderates and liberals (comprising
about 25-30% of the Republican electorate); somewhat conservative voters (comprising about
35-40%); very conservative evangelicals (comprising about 20%); and very conservative secular
voters (comprising about 5-10%). Noel (2016) delivered a finding consistent with Olsen & Scala
(2016) in identifying two internal factions within the conservative wing of the Republican party:
social traditionalists and free-market libertarians.
Although the word “faction” carries more than one meaning, a landmark study by Belloni
& Beller (1976) summarized that a faction can best be understood as follows:
As groups involved in conflict, as groups struggling against one another or against the
whole in a fundamentally political competition within the party…competing for control
and capture of the apparatus and directorship of the party organization…expressing and
furthering distinct interests in mutual competition – whether personal political ambitions,
or substantive policy or ideological interests. (p. 545).
While the aforementioned works have indeed provided evidence of the presence and
function of factions in presidential general elections, the literature is not as vocal on the role of
factions in presidential primaries. In their seminal study on factionalism, Belloni & Beller (1976)
found that factions composed a significant portion of political operations and thus should be
considered an investigatory priority. In an effort to lay out a conceptual framework for the study
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of factions, Boucek (2009) expanded on Belloni & Beller’s (1976) work, showing that political
parties were inherently composed of internally competing interests (Boucek, 2009, p. 455).
Crucial to note here is the distinction between primary elections and general elections
with respect to the practical operations of competing interests. Given that political parties consist
of various, internally competing interests (Boucek, 2009, p. 455) that are by and large inherently
partisan, it follows that in a general election the goals of separate, internal interests would be
aligned to get their party’s candidate elected (Koger, Masket, & Noel, 2009, 2010; Skinner,
Masket, & Dulio, 2012, 2013). It would be during the primaries, however, that rival interests
would jockey on the intra-party level for a chance to secure a nomination for their camp’s
preferred candidate.
2.11 Factions and Insurgencies as Unrepresentative Competitors in Presidential Primaries
In the United States, political parties are the venues through which competing interests
can seek to gain a foothold in positions and institutions of power (Katz, 2001, p. 278). Given that
political parties are, at least in theory, charged with performing the vital democratic function of
facilitating representation of party members, the openness by which the primaries are
characterized (e.g, Craig, 2016), and the existence of an electoral market demand for extreme
interests, the fear then is that parties can be hijacked by factions unrepresentative of the party
label under which they operate. The permeable design of modern liberal democracies
emphasized by Dahl (1956) and Truman (1951) and the existence of an array of avenues
available for citizens to advance particular policy agendas noted by Urbinati and Warren (2008,
p. 292) serve only to validate this fear.
In a study of nine candidate selection systems, Rahat, Hazan, & Katz (2008) found that
parties which were most internally democratic produced lists of candidates that were least
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representative of the broader electorate, and did not experience high levels of competition. This
study, however, was based on a proportional representation electoral system. While these
findings may not be directly transferrable to a single member district system such as that of the
United States, the findings may suggest that a similar phenomenon is occurring in the United
States. Similarly, Craig (2016) conducted a three-part case study examining examples of factions
that could potentially erode the power of parties – that is, hijack a party and use it as a vehicle to
gain power and advance policy agendas inconsistent with the best interests of that party’s
members. In her study, Craig (2016) illustrated that the vast openness of the primary process in
the United States allows comparatively extreme activist interests to mobilize support for extreme
candidates.
Craig’s (2016) finding is supported by studies on voter turnout which have highlighted
the existence of comparatively extreme primary electorates (e.g., Brady, Han, & Pope, 2007).
That is, voters in primary elections tend to be more ideologically convinced compared to general
election voters. Moreover, others have shown that voters in primary elections are
unrepresentative of the broader party electorate (e.g., Geer, 1988), substantiating the existence of
an electoral market demand for the “extreme” (or unrepresentative) activist interests described by
many (Craig, 2016; Brady, Han, & Pope, 2007; Olsen & Scala, 2016, p. 20; Farrar-Myers &
Skinner, 2012, p. 13). Consistent with Craig’s (2016) assessment, Masket found that “the
candidate selection process [in the United States] works systematically to produce polarized
partisan office holders” (2009, p. 51). Implicit here is that the vastly open and decentralized
candidate selection process of primaries in the United States (Craig, 2016; Gallagher & Marsh,
1988; Masket, 2009), coupled with the electoral market demand for comparatively extreme
interests (Brady, Han, & Pope, 2007; Craig, 2016; Geer, 1988) facilitates an environment in
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which unrepresentative candidates can compete for a presidential nomination and have a realistic
shot at securing it (Brady, Han, & Pope, 2007; Craig, 2016; Masket, 2009; Rahat, Hazan, &
Katz, 2008). But how did the ability of factions to compete in presidential primaries change after
Citizens United?
2.12 Extreme Factions: Funding then and now.
Prior to Citizens United and the advent of the Super PAC, moneyed interests generally
used PACs and 527s to finance and conduct campaign operations (Desmarais, La Raja, &
Kowal, 2014; Koger, Masket, & Noel, 2009, 2010; Skinner, Masket, & Dulio, 2012, 2013).
Research in the Party Network School has shown that connected partisan networks worked to
springboard candidates into electoral victory (Koger, Masket, & Noel, 2009, 2010; Skinner,
Masket, & Dulio, 2012, 2013; Skinner, 2005). The cooperation and interconnectedness of these
entities allowed them to benefit from economies of scale – synergy – resulting in the creation of
both financial and practical barriers to entry, hindering and complicating the chances for
ideologically extreme factions to win elections. The benefits conferred upon candidates who
were supported by these partisan networks were documented by Desmarais, La Raja, & Kowal
(2014). These researchers found that candidates supported by “densely interconnected partisan
communities have a greater likelihood of winning compared to those with similar campaign
resources and political backgrounds, but without [extended party network] backing” (Desmarais,
La Raja, & Kowal, 2014, p. 208). That was before 2010.
After the rulings in Citizens United and SpeechNow the Super PAC was born. Now,
competitors no longer need to rely on the network of support from dug-in groups and players in
Washington because Super PACs allow anyone with enough money to conduct similar campaign
operations. As Fishkin & Gerken (2015) observed:
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Outside groups – groups that are neither official party entities nor candidate campaigns –
have taken over a startling array of the core party functions. These groups do not just run
campaign ads. They mobilize voters, test messages, organize donors, maintain
comprehensive voter databases, employ long-term campaign workers, and make major
strategic choices in individual campaigns. (p. 176).
This observation is consistent with a common trend in the campaign finance literature that has
emerged since Citizens United, which is that presidential campaign committees have increasingly
been found to outsource to Super PACs the operations traditionally conducted by campaign
committees themselves. Such operations include buying ads (Farrar-Myers & Skinner, 2012;
Fishkin & Gerken, 2015, p. 188; Olsen & Scala, 2016, p.17), hiring campaign workers, and
running GOTV efforts (Fishkin & Gerken, 2015, p. 188). The reasoning here is that Super PACs
are far less restricted than campaign committees, and while coordination between campaign
committees and Super PACs is illegal, research has shown that the legal definition of
“coordination” fails to capture the coordination that occurs in practice (Fishkin & Gerken, 2015;
Garrett, 2012; Gerken, 2014; Farrar-Myers & Skinner, 2012; Nelson, 2013). Scholars have
referred to this phenomenon as “functional coordination” (e.g., Farrar-Myers & Skinner, 2012).
As Farrar-Myers and Skinner (2012) incisively articulated:
Candidates may end up not needing to worry about raising enough funds for their
own campaigns in small contributions from donors if instead Super PACs can
effectively functionally coordinate their activities so as to derive benefits for their
candidates. Candidates could easily become beholden to the large contributors
who finance the Super PACs that support them. (p. 23).
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Evidently, Super PACs have changed the electoral landscape, at least at the federal level,4 insofar
as campaign operations are concerned. As mentioned above, there are essentially two reasons for
this. First, Super PACs can spend unlimitedly on express advocacy through independent
expenditures so long as they do not coordinate with campaign committees. This sets Super PACs
apart from traditional PACs in essentially three ways: first, while both of the entities can spend
unlimitedly, PACs are subject to contribution limits which means that they must solicit many
many more potential contributors than must Super PACs who can simply have one donor who
provides hundreds of millions of dollars, for example; second, Super PACs are legally prohibited
from engaging in coordinated express advocacy. However, as described above, research has
shown that Super PACs nevertheless engage in “functional coordination” which essentially
makes coordination a moot point; third, when PACs fund advertisements, viewers almost always
know who that PAC supports. Super PAC funders, however, typically remain mystified under
ambiguous titles.5 Therefore, unlike PACs, Super PACs are able to hide behind these names and
not risk a negative backlash on the candidate they support (Brooks & Murov, 2012).
In sum and substance, the literature points to the idea that factions have been empowered
by the rulings in Citizens United and SpeechNow to raise disproportionate funds despite being
unrepresentative of the broader party electorate.
2.13 Power Vacuum: The Gap in the Literature
After reviewing the competing schools of thought and the associated strengths and
weaknesses I was able to identify a gap in the literature. The Party Network School draws
conclusions from personnel investigations to collectively assert that outside groups like 527s are

4

Note: I only review campaign finance changes at the federal level in this thesis. State-level
changes may or may not be consistent with what is observed at the federal level.
5
See Figure 2.1 for list of ambiguously-titled Super PACs in the 2016-2016 cycle.
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de facto extensions of the parties and offer to them the functions that the BCRA forbid parties
from conducting, such as raising and spending “soft money.” Conversely, the Shadow Party
Power School reviews the flow of funds and contends that the rulings in Citizens United and
SpeechNow deregulated outside groups to such an extent that the outside groups are now in
positions to martial influence in elections to an unprecedented degree. Interestingly, both schools
fall short in the same regard. That is, neither of the two schools offers workable definitions of
party “outsiders” or party “insiders.” Voilà the gap in the literature. In other words, both schools
agree that outside groups like 527s and Super PACs are powerful entities that can engage in
various electioneering activities. The Party Network School makes no meaningful distinction
between 527s and the party, and although the Shadow Party Power School does make this
distinction, it identifies no further, finer, nor nuanced line(s) of demarcation beyond simply
“party” and “outside groups.”
Therefore, given the gap in the scholarly literature, the well-documented presence of
factions within the parties, could it be the case that 527s and Super PACs have become the
primary vehicle through which minority factions are attempting to gain control of the entire
party? Assuming that is the case, are minority factions using Super PACs with more success than
mainstream party “insiders”?
2.14 Model & Hypothesis
In light of the foregoing review of the literature, the gap identified therein, and the
concluding inquiry, I offer the following hypothesis: Citizens United increased the ability of
ideologically extreme factions to fundraise. Figure 2.2 displays the research model which depicts
the hypothesis.
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Figure 2.2 – Research Model

Citizens United
>
Ideologically extreme factions increased ability to fundraise
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______________________________

CHAPTER III
DATA & ANALYSIS
______________________________
3.1 Research Design
I sought out to study the effects of Citizens United on the quality of democracy in the
United States political arrangement. As stated in Chapter Two, I hypothesized that Citizens
United increased the ability of ideologically extreme factions to fundraise. To test this
hypothesis, I operationalize the three variables, two independent and one dependent. In this
chapter, I set forth each of these variables and the data used to fuel them. I then discuss the
decisions behind each choice of data selection, variable selections, measures, and coding.
3.2 Citizens United: Moderator Variable
First, Citizens United v. FEC (552 U.S. 1278 (2010)) is the 2010 event that reversed
decades of campaign finance law by overruling parts of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce (494 U.S. 652 (1990)). Although SpeechNow v. FEC (559 F.3d 686 (2010)) was a
more proximate cause of the birth of the Super PAC, the D.C. Circuit in SpeechNow merely
extended the ruling in Citizens United which ultimately produced the Super PAC. Therefore, I
treated Citizens United as the cause behind the birth of the Super PAC. In any event, this is the
moderator variable. I coded for this legal-political event using a binary indicator, expressed as a
number 0 for prior to Citizens United and a number 1 for after the ruling. Since I have posited
that Citizens United increased the ability of ideologically extreme factions to fundraise, I needed
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to compare their fundraising ability before and after the ruling. This variable allowed me to
separate the datasets that I used for comparison.
3.3 Measuring the Ideology of Candidates
The second independent variable is ideology. This was the most complex of the three.
The nature of my hypothesis is such that I need to show in the first instance that if Citizens
United did in fact increase ideologically extreme factions’ ability to fundraise, then the data from
after 2010 should have reflected an increase in campaign receipts to ideologically extreme
campaigns or to the Super PACs and PACs that expressly supported them. To accomplish this, I
needed to separate candidates based on ideology. Indeed, political ideology is a moving target
that tends to change with time and experience. To have conducted this study by focusing only on
liberal v conservative ideologies, for example, would have revealed very little, if anything, about
factions themselves. As such, it was necessary to dig deeper, to undertake an examination of
relative ideologies within a major political camp. Ample research has pointed out the internal
factional divisions present in the Republican Party (DiSalvo, 2009; Olsen & Scala, 2016; Pew
Research, 2005; Ragusa & Gaspar, 2016). Since the literature is more vocal on the Republican
Party, I chose to review only internal divisions within the Republican Party.
But how does one quantify, measure or compare candidate ideology? A cursory
comparison of two candidates such as Jeb Bush and Ted Cruz would likely conclude with
agreement that there exists an ideological spread between the two. But what about comparing Jeb
Bush and Marco Rubio? Or Ted Cruz and Rand Paul? Clearly, a statistical approach was
requisite. To achieve this, I adopted the method devised by Adam Bonica of Stanford University
called the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (“DIME”) (Bonica, 2016).
Bonica (2016) devised an empirical method for comparing candidate ideology based on the
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ideology of contributors. DIME not only offers an appropriate and robust method for comparing
candidate ideology, but it offers pre-packaged, readily available information gleaned from its
databank consisting of over 100 million contributions records spanning from 1979 to 2016
(Bonica, 2016).
3.4 “CFscores”
Each candidate in the database is assigned an ideology score labelled a “CFscore” and
expressed as a number on a scale, with negative two (-2) being more liberal ideology score, zero
(0) being the most moderate, and positive two (+2) being more conservative. Figure 3.1 displays
an example of the scaling.

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

PAUL
(1.487)

GRCH
(1.147)

RMNY
(0.828)
STRM
(0.917)

Figure 3.1 – Visual Example of CFscore scaling Method displaying 2012 Republican
Presidential Candidates

1.4

1.6

The CFscores are based on campaign finance data from the FEC between 1979 and 2016.
Much of the literature and methodology that scores candidate ideology is based in large part on
roll call voting records. The major drawback of such methods is that they fail to account for the
ideological score of candidates who had no congressional or otherwise legislative voting record,
such as Donald J. Trump or Chris Christie. Fortunately, the DIME database scores candidates
based on the ideology of that candidate’s contributors, so candidates with no previous roll call
voting record are still scored and scaled just as appropriately as those with roll call vote histories.
Furthermore, the measure has the added advantage of accurately locating candidates
across different years, levels of government, and offices sought in the same ideological space.
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However, since the CFscore measures and compares candidates in the same ideological space,
and since the mainstream, moderate, or median ideology score changes over time, it was
necessary to restrict the analysis to exclusive cycles. In order to correct for this, I used a
standardization function in Microsoft Excel.
3.5 Adjusting CFscores for Specific Cycles using a Modified Standardization Function
(Modified Z-score).
In order to accomplish the task of measuring which candidates were considered extreme
in each specific election cycle, I restricted the main dataset to only include any Republican
candidate who (1) ran for federal office in one of the presidential primary cycles under review,
and (2) received at least twenty-five (25%) percent of the vote in their respective race. The result
of including all Republican candidates for federal office is a scale on which all candidates in a
given cycle fall, including the presidential candidates. In other words, I looked at the extremity
of the ideology of each candidate relative to the party at large in that cycle, rather than restricting
the review to only the primary candidates. However, the CFscores for each of those candidates
were still scaled in relation to all of the other candidates from 1979 to 2016. Therefore, it was
necessary to standardize the CFscores based on only the candidates in a specific cycle. To
achieve this, I considered using a standard z-score function that would take the CFscore of each
candidate in a cycle, and calculate the number of standard deviations that CFscore was from the
mean, like this:
z = ( cfscore – µ ) / σ
where µ is the mean, and σ is the standard deviation.
However, since I was dealing with a scale, I figured measuring distances from the mean
to be uninstructive. Rather, a candidate’s distance from the median would be more illustrative of
that candidate’s comparative ideology score. Therefore, to standardize each candidate’s CFscore
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in relation to the rest of the Republican candidates that ran for federal office in a given cycle, I
calculated the median absolute deviation (MAD) using the following formula:
MAD = ( m * (absolute value * ( cfscore – m * ( cfscore )))6
where m is the median.
I then used the MAD as the devisor in the following modified z-score formula to standardize the
cfscores for each cycle:
Modified Z-score

=
=

( cfscore – m ) / MAD
( cfscore – m ) / ( m * (absolute value * ( cfscore – m * ( cfscore )))

where m is the median.
Critical to note here is that the values produced by the modified z-score formula above
are not rendered in their mathematical absolute value – meaning they can be negative. However,
candidates with a negative modified z-score cannot be considered extreme because the negative
value means they are to the left of the median CFscore, which typically means they are more
“moderate” or even left-leaning. However, the purpose of this study is to review ideologically
extreme candidates within the Republican party, so I elect to consider only extreme candidates
with a positive modified z-score.
3.6 Outcome Variable: Ability to Raise Funds
The dependent variable is ability to fundraise. First, I adopted the assumption that a
candidate’s ability to fundraise directly translated into the act of fundraising. In other words, the
significance of undertaking a nearly year-long campaign in a presidential primary is so intense
that a candidate is expected to maximize his or her fundraising. Therefore, I incorporate here the

6

For those seeking to replicate this method, the exact formula entered into Microsoft Excel was
this: =MEDIAN*(ABS*(CFSCORE – MEDIAN *(CFSCORE))).
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assumption that if a candidate has the ability to fundraise at a certain level, the candidate will
fundraise at that level. To express this outcome variable, I first calculated the sum of all of the
following variables in each cycle-specific Republican presidential primary:7
i.  
ii.  
iii.  
iv.  

total campaign receipts;
total party coordinated expenditures;
total contributions made on behalf of the candidate; and
non-party independent expenditures made in support of the candidate.

Since I am only studying the Republican Presidential primaries, this composite of sums includes
only all contributions and expenditures for presidential candidates that were transacted before the
date of each cycle’s specific Republican National Convention.8 This allowed me to strike out all
contributions that went to that cycle’s nominee in the general election. This composite is
expressed as TCE, where E indicates one of four election cycles (this variable is developed more
fully in Chapter III, Section VII). Second, I calculated the percentage of those aggregated
receipts that went to extreme candidates (PTCEX). Next, I compared the percentages that extreme
candidates received before and after Citizens United to reveal whether the hypothesis is
confirmed or denied – i.e., whether ideologically extreme factions’ ability to fundraise increased
after Citizens United.
Given the nature of my hypothesis – i.e., that Citizens United increased something – I
needed to review data from both before and after the ruling. Moreover, I decided to investigate
presidential primaries. Therefore, I selected four presidential primaries to review: two before and
two after the 2010 ruling. The first pair included the 2004 and 2008 Republican presidential
primaries (control group), and the second pair included those of 2012 and 2016 (treated group). I

7

The source of the data for said campaign and Super PAC receipts is OpenSecrets.Org, which is
the same data source used by DIME.
8
The cutoff dates for each cycle’s Republican National Convention are listed in Appendix II.
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investigated only the presidential primaries of the Republican Party. Indeed, even if my
hypothesis was confirmed, and setting aside all other design limitations, a claim about all
ideologically extreme candidates would not be available since I only reviewed the Republican
Party. I leave it up to further research to extend this study to include additional parties. That said,
if my hypothesis is confirmed, even with strong statistical significance, I would only be able to
make a modest general claim about Super PACs and ideologically extreme candidates in the
Republican primaries, at best.
Nevertheless, the decision to examine and include data from these four election cycles is
grounded in two factors. First, the first pair of election cycles acted as the control group,
providing data for a time period in which the Super PAC was not part of the political equation.
The second pair of election cycles acts as the treated group, where extreme candidates had the
opportunity to receive Super PAC support. Second, by examining two cycles for each group, the
effect of random variation and one-off events was reduced.
3.7 Computation and Comparison
In order to test the hypothesis, I needed to compare the figures from before and after
Citizens United to determine if an increase did in fact exist. In order to achieve this, I assigned
the figures the following shorthanded variables:
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First, total contributions, TC9, in election cycle E, where E is one of four cycles – 2004,
2008, 2012, or 2016.10 So, the TC for election cycle 2016 would be expressed as TC2016.
Next, the contributions, C, in cycle E that went to Republican candidate R. Each R is
assigned a shorthanded four-letter personal identifier displayed in Figure 4.1 in Chapter IV. So,
for example, to show that George W. Bush received $100 million in contributions in 2004, I
wrote C2004BUSH = $100 million.
Next, the percentage of total contributions, PTC, in election cycle E that went to
candidate R is expressed as PTCER.
Next, the percentage of total contributions, PTC, in election cycle E that went to extreme
candidates, X. This is expressed as PTCEX.
For the hypothesis to be confirmed I was looking for the values of PTC2004X and
PTC2008X to both be less than those of PTC2012X and PTC2016X.
Figure 3.2 – A Confirmed Hypothesis
PTC2004X and PTC2008X

9

< PTC2012X and PTC2016X

TC values are composites sums of the following four (4) separate observations listed in DIME:
total campaign receipts (total.receipts); total party coordinated expenditures (party.coord.exp);
total contributions made on behalf of candidate (comm.cost.for); and non-party independent
expenditures made in support of the candidate (non.party.ind.exp.for). These values do not
include transactions made on or after the date of each cycle-specific Republican National
Convention.
10
The large differences in TC values across cycles is offset by examining percentages, which
allows for cross-cycle comparison.
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______________________________

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS & DISCUSSION
______________________________
In Chapter III all of the variables, parameters, data selections, codes, and modifications
were set forth. In this chapter, I first present the results of the analysis and explain the
implications of the findings. Second, I engage in a discussion as to the larger implications of the
study, the design limitations, and avenues for further and future research.
4.2 Results
I examined the fundraising ability of ideologically extreme factions and candidates in
four election cycles: 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016. Figure 4.1 displays each of the candidates that
ran in the election cycles under review. By performing the modified z-score function on each of
the Republican candidates for federal office with at least 25% of the vote, a list of each
presidential candidate was produced which is set forth fully in Appendix I. From those lists, I
used the modified z-score cutoff of zero point nine (0.9) to separate extreme candidates from the
rest of the heard. The result of that line of demarcation was the following list of extreme
candidates and their corresponding percentage of total contributions in Figure 4.2.

HONORS COLLEGE THESIS – JOHN J. DOWLING, III. – LIU POST 2017
Figure 4.1 – Candidates who Competed in each Cycle under Review
Year
2004 (2)

Year
2008 (8)

Candidates
Blake Ashby [ASHB]
George W. Bush [BUSH]
Candidates
Fred Thompson [TMSN]
Rudy Guiliani [GIUL]
Mike Huckabee [HUCK]
John McCain [MCCN]
Mitt Romney [RMNY]
Ron Paul [PAUL]
-

Year
2012 (4)

Year
2016 (10)

Candidates
Newt Gingrich [GRCH]
Ron Paul [PAUL]
Mitt Romney [RMNY]
Rick Santorum [STRM]
Candidates
Jeb Bush [BUSH]
Ben Carson [CRSN]
Chris Christie [CRST]
Ted Cruz [CRUZ]
Carly Fiorina [FIOR]
Mike Huckabee [HUCK]
Rand Paul [PAUL]
Marco Rubio [RBIO]
Rick Santorum [STRM]
Donald J. Trump [TRMP]

Figure 4.2 – List of Extreme Candidates and their PTCER
Cycle
2004
2008
2012
2016

Candidate
PAUL
FRED
HUCK
GRCH
PAUL
CRUZ
CRSN
RBIO
TRMP
PAUL

PTCER
0%
4.86%
2.09%
2.56%
14.38%
1.85%
2.72%
26.02%
18.09%
14.21%
5.01%

After calculating the PTCEX for each cycle, the following results were produced in Figure 4.3:
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Figure 4.3 – PTCEX 2004 through 2016

Percentage of Total Contributions to Extreme Candidates
in Republican Presidential Primaries 2004-2016
66.05%

70%
60%

PTCEX

50%
40%
30%
16.23%

20%
9.51%

10%
0%
0%
2004

2008

2012

2016

ELECTION CYCLE

Evidently, the values of PTC2004X and PTC2008X are both less than the values of PTC2012X and
PTC2016X. Therefore, the hypothesis is safely confirmed.
4.3 Discussion
The results of the analysis provide empirical evidence that directly support the claim
asserted by the Shadow Party Power School that so-called party “outsiders” are in a better
position to fundraise after Citizens United. Both the Shadow Party Power School and the Party
Network School addressed the roll of outsiders and insiders with respect to various legal entities
and their associated fundraising ability and campaign functions. Neither of the two schools
adequately defined party outsider or party insider. To refresh the reader’s memory, this is exactly
the gap in the literature that I sought to fill. In so doing, I used the CFscores of the studied
candidates to separate party outsiders from party insiders, but I used the term “extreme” to refer
to outsiders. The results of the analysis provide vivid evidence to support the Shadow Party
Power School’s argument that so-called party “outsiders” are in a better position to fundraise
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after Citizens United. Figure 4.3 clearly indicates an increase in the PTCEX with a rapid spike
after 2012. This makes sense. The first presidential election cycle in which Super PACs were
engaged was 2012. It would follow intuitively that the Super PAC and the inherent campaigning
and financial power therein would not have been adequately grasped by campaigners until after
at least one cycle of experience. By 2016, it appears there had been enough experience with the
legal entity to make use of it properly.
Looking again the PTC2016X displayed in Figure 4.3, it is clear that more than two thirds
of total contributions went to extreme candidates. Where as in previous cycles this figure had not
even scratched twenty-five percent, the most recent cycle featured a 400% increase in the
percentage of total contributions that went to extreme candidates since 2012. Thus, it would
appear that extreme candidates are in a better position to fundraise as time goes on.
What is more, these findings suggest that a larger phenomenon is occurring in the United
States political landscape: Extreme candidates who are inherently unrepresentative of the broader
party electorate are getting more of the campaign funds. I found that these individuals are
attracting fundraising sums in excess of those raised by non-extreme candidates. Therefore, the
findings suggest that Citizens United increased the fundraising ability of minority candidates and
factions – i.e., minority groups within the Republican Party. In other words, these findings
support the argument that Citizens United empowered minority factions and candidates within
the Republican Party to raise disproportionate funds despite being unrepresentative of the
broader party electorate. What this means for democracy will always be controlled by how one
defines democracy. Nevertheless, if one adopts the assumption that a more democratic United
States is one in which minority factions within the Republican Party do not attract the bulk of
campaign funds, then these findings may disappoint.
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4.4 Grains of Salt: Limitations of the Research Design
While I attempted to construct an airtight research design, it is by no means impenetrable
to critique. There are a number of limitations to the research design that need to be disclosed in
order to understand what the findings say, and what they do not.
First, I reviewed four (4) Republican Presidential primaries. The 2004 cycle only
included two primary contenders, one of whom was the incumbent president. Ample research
has testified to the so-called incumbency advantage (e.g., Ansolabehere, et al., 2007). What is
more, when George W. Bush ran for re-election in 2004, the United States was engaged in a
number of wars and foreign policy entanglements to such an extent that President Bush may (and
probably did) have had a stronger incumbency advantage. Secondly, Bush’s sole competitor in
2004 did not even garner 1.0% of the TC2004, which resulted in the PTC2004X to yield a figure
zero. In retrospect, I should have chosen the 2000 cycle instead of the 2004 cycle, as the 2000
cycle did not feature an incumbent presidential candidate.
Second, John Kasich was not included in the DIME database for the 2016 cycle. Had he
been included, the median of the CFscores and the median absolute deviation for the 2016
dataset might have been different by a minor degree. Additionally, a brief speculation as to John
Kasich’s ideology might safely lead one to conclude that Mr. Kasich would not be considered an
extreme candidate. Therefore, had he been included in the 2016 dataset, the PTC2016X may have
been reduced by a minor degree. Nevertheless, given the comparatively massive size of
PTC2016X, it is highly unlikely that including Mr. Kasich would reduce PTC2016X to a number
that would reverse the findings. Had the missing candidate been a financial heavyweight such as
Jeb Bush, Donald J. Trump, or Ben Carson, that would have been cause for concern. This,
however, was not the case. Therefore, this limitation is weighted very lightly.
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Third, the modified z-score cutoff that I selected was zero point nine (0.9). This is
admittedly a subjective figure. However, I could devise no purely objective method for
separating candidates without using some figure such as this.
Fourth, the DIME database did not include CFscores for Donald J. Trump, Carly Fiorina,
Jeb Bush, or Chris Christie for the 2016 cycle. Therefore, I was charged with making a judgment
call as to whether to include each of their contributions in PTC2016X. In so doing, I believe I
safely placed Donald J. Trump into the extreme (outsider) category, and Carly Fiorina, Jeb Bush
and Chris Christie into the non-extreme (insider) category. I leave it up to the reader to disagree.
4.5 Avenues for Further and Future Research
Overall, this study was limited in that I only reviewed four election cycles. There was an
incumbent president in the first cycle, and not all candidates were scored in the last cycle.
Moreover, I only studied Republicans. Perhaps a future inquiry including the Democrat Party as
well would yield more fruitful results. Furthermore, I relied on the assumption that the ability to
fundraise directly translated into the act of fundraising. Relying on this assumption created a
backbone of rationale for my hypothesis, particularly the outcome variable (ability to fundraise).
I maintain that this assumption was necessary. However, perhaps future researchers may devise a
more insightful measure of ability to fundraise. Moreover, a future researcher on this topic would
be well-advised to include additional election cycles to allow for a larger sample size.
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______________________________

CHAPTER V
CLOSING ARGUMENTS
______________________________
5.1 Summation
Electoral competition and representation are two championed cornerstones of American
democracy. When courts deliver opinions that have implications for those cornerstones, viewers
and commentators naturally react. This thesis represents an empirical test of one of those
reactions. The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
(552 U.S. 1278 (2010)) reversed decades of federal campaign finance law that prohibited
corporations, labor unions, and other entities from engaging in independent expenditures using
their general treasury funds. Two months later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia extended that ruling in SpeechNow v. FEC (559 F.3d 686 (2010)) when the D.C.
Circuit held that non-profit organizations seeking to make independent expenditures on expressly
advocating for the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office could do
so without limit. This pair of rulings gave birth to the Super PAC – a type of political action
committee that can spend unlimitedly on advocating for the election or defeat of a specific
candidate for federal office.
In the aftermath of these rulings, a body of scholarship emerged that studied various
consequences of the rulings. One of these was whether Super PACs were merely an additional
legal mechanism for party insiders to continue to conduct campaign and electioneering
operations, or whether the Super PAC represented a novel legal entity that challenged the power
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of party insiders. In this thesis, I examined whether party outsiders’ ability to fundraise increased
after Citizens United and the introduction of the Super PAC. The results of the analysis indicated
vividly that party outsiders were indeed in a better position to fundraise after Citizens United.
These findings provide empirical evidence to support the claim advanced by the Shadow Party
Power School that Citizens United empowered outside groups at the expense of the party
insiders. As for the impact of Citizens United on the quality of democracy, these findings support
my hypothesized argument that Citizens United empowered minority factions and candidates
within the Republican Party to raise disproportionate funds despite being unrepresentative of the
broader party electorate.
To cycle back to normative concerns addressed in the opening of Chapter I, campaign
finance has largely been framed a clash between two separate but equally compelling democratic
values: liberty and equality. Is one to view the findings as a victory for liberty? Or as a loss for
equality? Perhaps one need not confine himself to such diametric terms. The U.S Supreme Court
in Citizens United predicated part of its opinion on the reasoning that the government ought not
to restrict speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity (552 U.S. 1278 (2010)). While
the popular argument at the time was that the Court “opened the floodgates” for corporations to
spend without limit in our elections, ample empirical research demonstrated that this was not the
case (e.g., LaRaja & Schaffner, 2013). Rather, the court in SpeechNow took the Citizens United
precedent and applied it to non-profit organizations – 527s (559 F.3d 686 (2010)). It was these
entities that became the Super PACs through which over a billion dollars have been spent on
elections. One of the results of these rulings is that extreme candidates appear to be better off at
fundraising than they were prior to 2010. But if party outsiders are better off than party insider

HONORS COLLEGE THESIS – JOHN J. DOWLING, III. – LIU POST 2017

54

candidates, does that suggest that Citizens United created a campaign finance arena in which
minority factions and interests end up taking over the party nomination process? Probably not.
Research has illustrated that primary electorates tend to be more partisan than general
electorates (Brady, Han, & Pope, 2007; Geer, 1988). If Super PACs empowered ideologically
extreme candidates to compete with party insiders, then the result can be framed as Citizens
United having merely increased the electoral supply of candidates which partisan primary
electorates seem to demand. If all of the benefits of having support from the formal parties and
527 information networks (Koger, Masket, Noel, 2012, 2013; Skinner, Masket, Dulio, 2012,
2013) are effectively challenged by the power of Super PACs, then party outsiders are now
simply able to compete with party insiders more effectively. From this view, it would appear that
Citizens United had a positive impact on the quality of democracy in the United States.
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APPENDIX I
________
2016 Republican Presidential Primary
NAME

cf.score

CRUZ
CRSN
RBIO
TRMP
BUSH
STRM
PAUL
FIOR
CRST
HUCK

modified z
score

1.297
1.4
1.151
n/a
n/a
0.917
1.385
n/a
n/a
1.103

2.082
2.851
0.993
-7.597
-7.597
-0.754
2.739
-7.597
-7.597
0.634
Total:

TC2016R
$6,654,775.62
$63,606,615.95
$44,224,029.5
$34,740,677.93
$34,696,569.26
$23,552,730.52
$12,256,204.21
$12,079,684.58
$8,415,486.91
$4,264,646.14
$244,491,420.6

PTC2016R
2.72
26.02
18.09
14.21
14.19
9.63
5.01
4.94
3.44
1.74
-

________
2012 Republican Presidential Primary
NAME
RMNY
GRCH
STRM
PAUL

cf.score
0.828
1.147
0.917
1.487

modified z
TC2012R
PTC2012R
score
-1.319
$323,038,185 73.61005593
0.993
$63,124,454.3 14.38404135
-0.674
$44,560,472.8 10.15390455
3.457
$8,127,505.41 1.851998171
Total:
$438,850,617.5
-

________
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2008 Republican Presidential Primary
NAME
PAUL
GIUL
TPSN
HUCK
MCCN
RMNY

cf.score

modified z
score

1.487
0.483
1.096
1.103
0.669
0.828

5.879
-5.154
1.582
1.659
-3.11
-1.363
Total:

TC2008R

PTC2008R

$5,014,288.66
$7,781,743.65
$2,158,175.07
$2,647,446.01
$35,128,672.7
$50,373,482.9
$103,103,809

4.86333988
7.547484158
2.093205955
2.567748016
34.0711687
48.85705329
-

________
2004 Republican Presidential Primary
NAME
BUSH
ASHB

cf.score
0.863
n/a

modified z
score

TC2004R
0.027
0.809

________

N/A
N/A

PTC2004R
>99%
<1.0%
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